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The Arrest and Trial of Paul Rusesabagina and its Impact on
Rwandan Foreign Affairs
Abstract
The 2020 arrest and subsequent trial of Paul Rusesabagina fostered controversy about
Rwanda’s human rights record and the political dominance of President Paul Kagame
against oppositional voices. Despite human rights organizations and even the European
Union condemning the arrest and questioning the ability for him to receive a fair trial,
Rwandans remain resolute in their desire to seek justice against Rusesabagina. He is best
known as the African version of Oscar Schindler because of the 2004 movie, Hotel Rwanda.
However, the historical narrative of Rusesabagina’s heroism is questioned within Rwanda.
Additionally, he is accused of forming ties to numerous terrorist groups which committed
deadly attacks in Rwanda. This article examines Rusesabagina’s role during and after the
1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and the impact of his arrest and trial on Rwanda’s foreign
relations.
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Introduction
On August 27, 2020, Rwandan officials arrested Paul Rusesabagina,
the hero from the movie Hotel Rwanda. His arrest came after boarding
a flight in Dubai believing it would arrive in Burundi for him to meet
with religious leaders. Rusesabagina arrest came moments after the
private flight arrived in Kigali, Rwanda, for his alleged support for the
National Liberation Front (FLN), Rwanda Movement for Democratic
Change (MRCD) and Party of Democracy in Rwanda – Ihumure (PDRIhumure). Later, he faced thirteen accounts of financing and
coordinating with the PDR-Ihumure and the MRCD in several terrorist
attacks over the past few years.1 Within Rwanda, the response to the
arrest was relatively joyous as many perceive Rusesabagina as an
opportunist during the genocide and a dangerous antagonist since, who
has used his fame to support ethnic divisionism and terrorism.2 The
reaction was much different outside of Rwanda. International human
rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and global
government institutions such as the European Union condemned the
arrest.3 Critical journalists and academics used the arrest to repeat
existing narratives criticizing Rwanda’s post-genocide development.
The international responses angered many Rwandans, especially the
victims of Rusesabagina’s suspected ties to terrorist attacks. His
involvement, whether planning, financing, or using his public platform
for support led many Rwandans to approve of his capture. Rwandans
on social media attacked anyone criticizing the arrest and subsequent
trial.
The international community has had a rather limited response to the
arrest, trial, and conviction of Rusesabagina. The European Union
passed a resolution condemning the arrest titled: European Parliament
resolution of February 11, 2021 on Rwanda, the case of Paul
Rusesabagina (2021/2543(RSP)). Nevertheless, it appears to be a
rather limited response by the international community.4 The U.S.
Department of State issued5 a vague statement of the situation,
“engaged the government of Rwanda at the highest levels.”6 Belgium,
which Paul Rusesabagina holds dual citizenship with, has also not
publicly condemned the arrest and instead responded similarly to the
U.S. Department of State releasing a statement mentioning how it is
‘observing’ the proceedings and providing any requested support.”7 The
United Kingdom, one of Rwanda’s most important foreign allies, has
remained relatively quiet on the issue beyond the Member of
Parliament Andrew Mitchell publicly supporting Rwanda’s right to
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arrest Rusesabagina under the nation’s anti-terrorism laws.8 On
September 20, 2021, Rusesabagina was convicted on terrorism charges
with the possibility of spending twenty-five years in prison.9 This
research examines why the most prevalent condemnation of
Rusesabagina’s arrest and trial stem from foreign human rights critics
rather than state governments. The article provides a review of not only
Rusesabagina’s role during the genocide and fame from the film, Hotel
Rwanda but how Rwandans perceive him. Additionally, it attempts to
understand how the arrest of Rusesabagina does not seriously impact
Rwanda’s foreign relations with the international community or its
standing within the international community. It applies a
Constructivists and Neorealist theoretical framework of the current
Rusesabagina situation within Rwanda’s foreign relations.
The research begins by examining Rusesabagina’s constructed identity
as the ‘hero of Hotel Rwanda,’ the Hôtel des Mille Collines. Relying on
testimonies from survivors of the Hotel and a former neighbor, the
section depicts Rusesabagina more of an opportunist. The research
shifts to examine Rusesabagina’s actions since departing Rwanda
shortly after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, and how he has
received praise for his actions during the genocide and used it as a
platform to criticize Rwanda’s post-genocide development. The
following section examines his arrest and trial within the framework of
his arrest, accusations, and Rwandan perceptions. After constructing
the history and current situation of Rusesabagina, the article turns to
examine how it impacts Rwanda’s foreign relations. It argues that the
arrest and trial of Rusesabagina influenced decision making within
Rwandan foreign policy based on Rwanda’s own perception of the
intersubjective beliefs of abandonment, agaciro, a Kinyarwanda term
that best can be described as the promotion of self-reliance, and
Rwandan human security. Additionally, it examines how the
international community might restrain its response to Rwanda’s
capture and trial of Rusesabagina.
This research relies on qualitative research conducted during multiple
fieldwork periods between 2008 to 2018.10 The research uses existing
networks within the Rwandan government and other civil society
organizations used while conducting research on Rwandan foreign
policy.11 Additional observations that influenced this research stems
from interviews with survivors of the Hôtel des Mille Collines. A total of
one hundred informants were involved. However, twenty interviewed
participants comprising of actors working either as policy makers, civil
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society or in the private sector. Questions focused on their individual,
societal and government perceptions of Rusesabagina and Rwandan
foreign relations. Eighty other Rwandan informants were either
interviewed or held conversations with the author. Within this group
are sixty survivors of the Hôtel des Mille Collines during the genocide.
The remaining twenty were genocide survivors and one former
Interahamwe perpetrator stationed by the hotel during the genocide.
Conversations and interviews typically lasted an hour and occurred
within the Rwandan cities of Kigali and Gisenyi. While not all the
discussions were based on a typical interview structure, the data
collected came from consenting conversations and discussions on this
topic. Using Interpretivism, found within Constructivism, assisted in
better understand the social meanings found within the collected
data.12 In addition, triangulation methods verified if informants’
comments followed similar statements from other interviews.13

Rusesabagina During the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi
The 2004 Hollywood film, Hotel Rwanda, starring Don Cheadle as the
resourceful Rusesabagina who through his cunning, negotiating skills
and undisputed humanitarian beliefs helped save 1,268 Rwandans who
fled to the hotel.14 The film’s depiction of Rusesabagina was akin to
Oscar Schindler, who saved an estimated 1,200 Jews from the Nazis
during the Holocaust. It elevated his acts during the genocide despite
seemingly overlooking what had occurred within the hotel. It has also
led to great resentment by the hotel survivors and genocide survivors.
Those who sought refuge at the Hôtel des Mille Collines have spoken
out against Rusesabagina as the reason for their survival. Several
researchers such as Melvern, Beloff, Ndahiro and Rutazibwa as well as
Kayihura and Zukus have interviewed Hotel survivors and uncovered a
rather different description of events from both within the movie and
Rusesabagina’s quasi-autobiography, An Ordinary Man.15 This section
is not attempting to provide a detailed illustration of what occurred at
the hotel, but instead to provide opposing context to Rusesabagina’s
story during and shortly after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi to
illustrate why, within Rwanda, he is not perceived as a hero. This
perspective provides insights on why the Rwandan government would
be willing to arrest, prosecute and convict Rusesabagina despite
possible international backlash.
Prior to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Paul Rusesabagina worked
at the Hotel Diplomates, another hotel just a short distance away from
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the Hôtel des Mille Collines within Rwanda’s capital city of Kigali. 16
While he had previous experience working at the hotel, he was not
employed by them just prior to the genocide. After the assassination of
Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana on the night of April 6, 1994,
the hotel’s identity dramatically shifted from being a luxurious hotel to
a refugee camp. After the genocide’s initial days passed, the
international community supplied a large military task force to remove
all expatriates after which it would abandon the country to its fate of
genocide.17 This included the Belgium hotel manager Bik Cornelis,
whose absence allowed Rusesabagina to take power of the hotel despite
Cornelis leaving responsibility to another man, Pasa Mwenenganucye.
Nevertheless, through his cunning and calls with the Sabena owners of
the Hôtel des Mille Collines, Rusesabagina took over the hotel’s
leadership. While ignored by Rusesabagina, he instructed the hotel to
become a refugee center without cost to those seeking refuge.18
Life within the hotel’s compound was difficult with the constant threat
of removal if one could no longer pay Rusesabagina. One survivor
described, “If you could pay, you would stay in a room. If you couldn’t
pay for a room, you could pay to stay in a hallway. If you couldn’t pay
that, you could pay to stay by the pool. If you couldn’t pay that, he
[Rusesabagina] would demand you to leave.”19 Even hotel staff were
not spared with one maintenance worker describing the conditions
placed upon him and his family.
He described:
During the second or third day of the genocide, I was able to
escape [the hotel] to find my family to bring them back in. Once
I returned with my family, Rusesabagina asked me for money
[for their stay at the hotel]. I told him that I work at the hotel,
and these were my family. He didn’t care. He told me that I
would have to pay for his family to stay and pay him even for
myself when I wasn’t working.20
For those who did not have the resources to pay, they would face
threats of eviction from the hotel. One survivor, who was a child during
the genocide, described how while residing by the pool waiting for his
parents, he encountered Rusesabagina who demanded to know if he
had paid to stay there. Standing next to Rusesabagina was a Hutu
genocide leader who insisted to Rusesabagina to leave the boy alone as
he would “be killed at another time.”21 These stories provide a rather
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contradictory historical narrative than often portrayed in the Global
North, a term used to describe the developed or First World nations,
about Rusesabagina.
Within a roughly one-hundred-day period between April 6 to July 19,
Rwanda witnessed the deaths of up to one million Tutsi and moderate
Hutus.22 Within Kigali, the Hôtel des Mille Collines was one of the few
refugee areas. While many credit Rusesabagina for creating an oasis
during the conflict, it is not the reason for why the hotel survived. The
Interahamwe, the primary Hutu death squads responsible for the
genocidal killings, mostly stayed outside the walls of the Hôtel des
Mille Collines allowing people to flee to the hotel but not allowing any
out or the faced death. One former Interahamwe stationed perhaps
twenty meters from the hotel’s entrance received instructions to, “we
[Interahamwe] were told to just stay put by the hotel [Hôtel des Mille
Collines] and to allow the Tutsis and others to have access. We would
scare those trying to flee to the hotel, but barely ever killed them.” 23
When asked why he was instructed to allow people into the Hôtel des
Mille Collines he responded, “we were told by a regional commander
that the hotel was being used for prisoner exchanges and it would be
the final spot for us to cleanse [murdering the Tutsis] once we beat the
[Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)].”24 The hotel quickly became a
negotiating mechanism for the Hutu genocide government during its
limited engagement with the RPF for prisoners exchanges.25 Some
survivors commented their surprise to reach the hotel but also how the
United Nation’s soldiers protected it.26 Not depicted in Hotel Rwanda
are the seven to ten United Nation’s Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR) soldiers that were constantly positioned in front of the
hotel. The former commander of UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire writes of
how he placed a handful of soldiers in front of the hotel’s only entrance
as a symbolic indication how the hotel was under the protection of
UNAMIR.27 Additionally, he has spoken out against Hotel Rwanda as
historical revisionism.28
After the genocidal killings ended in Kigali on July 4, Rusesabagina
returned to the Hotel Diplomates until he departed Rwanda in 1996.
Rusesabagina’s describes leaving Rwanda as a result from an
employment change within Sabena, which also was operating the Hotel
Diplomates at the time, along with allegations that the RPF threatened
his own life.29 However, after the genocide and the creation of the new
RPF post-genocide government, many Rwandans perceived
Rusesabagina’s acquired wealth accumulated during the genocide as
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ethically problematic and dismissed his post-genocide status. One
former neighbor of Rusesabagina commented during a discussion:
Rusesabagina was angry and often complained how he expected
a government job after the genocide. After all, he led the hotel
[Hôtel des Mille Collines] during the genocide and acquired
wealth from it. But no, the RPF didn’t care about what he did
during the genocide. They only cared about burying the bodies
and rebuilding the country through their [political] beliefs.
Rusesabagina was a no one and that bothered him.30
By 2004, the film, Hotel Rwanda, depicted Rusesabagina’s life during
the genocide. He became one of the most recognized Rwandans while
providing speaking tours to university campuses and establishing in
2006 the Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation. While the reasons
for Rusesabagina’s emigration from Rwanda are debated, there is a
belief in Rwanda that Rusesabagina was not the hero depicted by Don
Cheadle in the movie. The historical inaccuracies not only irritate
survivors of the Hôtel des Mille Collines but reinforce a negative
perception of Rusesabagina even prior to his later involvement in the
MRCD and the PDR-Ihumure. Since the release of the film,
Rusesabagina became more of a concern for the Rwandan government
and genocide survivors with his outspoken political criticisms, denial of
the genocide and support for terrorist rebel groups.

Support for Rebel Groups and Eventual Arrest
On August 31, 2020, the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB)
announced the arrest of Paul Rusesabagina for his involvement with
the MRCD and the PDR-Ihumure, which committed terrorist attacks at
Nyabimata in June and at Nyungwein December 2018. The arrest came
after Rwandan officials previously issued an international arrest
warrant.31 Prior to his arrest, Rusesabagina lived a relatively
comfortable life as a speaker since the movie. In 2006, he alongside
Tom Zoellner wrote and published, An Ordinary Man: An
Autobiography which provided a more personal understanding of
Rusesabagina as well as contradicting elements within Hotel Rwanda.
32 He received multiple awards such as the Immortal Chaplains Prize
for Humanity, Tom Lantos Human Rights Prize from the Lantos
Foundation for Human Rights and Justice, Freedom Award from the
National Civil Rights Museum and in 2005, received the Presidential
Medal of Freedom from former U.S. President George W. Bush.33 While
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his reputation increased in the Global North, his focus began to shift
away from discussing the genocidal events at the Hôtel des Mille
Collines to political issues within Rwanda. Increasingly, he became
critical of President Paul Kagame and the current Rwandan
government.34 Additionally, he began to even disagree with historical
narratives of the genocide. Akin to Rever, he argued the RPF was
responsible for the death of former President Habyarimana and
infiltrated the Interahamwe death squads.35 Melvern describes this
claim of the RPF as perpetrators during the Genocide against the Tutsi
as promoting a false historical narrative to deny the seriousness of the
genocide.36
Rusesabagina held a lecture on February 16, 2007, at Kean
University.37 Entering the hall with two large security guards,
Rusesabagina spoke little about the events at the Hôtel des Mille
Collines and instead of his hatred for President Paul Kagame. His
speech focused on denying that the genocide ever took place against the
nation’s Tutsi population to an audience largely ignorant of Rwanda’s
genocide. Rather, his focus was on the RPF revenge killings during the
Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994). His attacks were not only against
President Kagame but of Rwanda’s post-genocide development stating
the suppression of ethnic divisions was part of a conspiracy by the
region’s Tutsis population. The attacks against Rwanda’s post-genocide
development during the lecture was not unique as it had become a
staple of his university speeches.38
Rusesabagina’s political beliefs did not just remain in the confines of
speeches, as he formulated the political parties, the MRCD, FLN
alongside the PDR-Ihumure. These political and rebel organizations
called for the removal by any means of the RPF and supported a return
to ethnic divisions of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The Rwandan government
replaced these identities with instead a uniform ‘Rwandan’ ethnic
identity.39 Videos surfaces of Rusesabagina, described as the President
of MRCD-FLN, speaking of the necessity of armed conflict against the
Rwandan government. This announcement was enough for the
Rwandan government to accuse Rusesabagina of supporting for
terrorism.40 As mentioned earlier, in 2018, fighters associated with the
PDR-Ihumure committed terrorist’s attacks killing at least nine. 41
Rusesabagina has denied directing the attacks.42 However after his
arrest, Rusesabagina did take responsibility for founding the PDRIhumure and admitted it had invaded with a small military rebel force
parts of Nyungwe forest in southwestern Rwanda.43 His connection to
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militant groups were not only with the PDR-Ihumure as German
intelligence officials previously uncovered messages between
Rusesabagina and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
(FDLR), a rebel group composing the remnants of genocide fights and
ideology, former leader Ignace Murwanashyaka.44 He has denied
providing financial support to the FDLR.45 These accusations alongside
Rusesabagina’s public speaking impacted Rwandan perceptions of
Rusesabagina by confirming what many had previously believed of him
being an opportunist. The major difference between 1994 and now was
Rusesabagina desire for political power.46
Rusesabagina’s Arrest
On August 27, 2020, Rusesabagina flew on a GainJet charter flight to
what he had believed would arrive in Burundi based on an invitation by
Pastor Constantin Niyomwungere to speak at a church; however, his
flight would be directed to Rwanda.47 It would later be uncovered by
Minister of Justice Johnston Busingye that the Rwandan government
had paid for Rusesabagina’s flight.48 Human Rights Watch accused the
Rwandan government of intentionally misleading Rusesabagina and
torturing him during the flight to Kigali.49 On August 31,
Rusesabagina’s arrest became public with the accusation of supporting
anti-Rwandan groups such as the FLN, MRCD and the PDR-Ihumure.
In addition, are charges of terrorism, arson, kidnapping, and murder in
the 2018 PDR-Ihumure attacks.50 Since his arrest, he faced trial within
a Kigali Rwandan court on thirteen charges, found guilty with the
resulting punishment of twenty-five years in jail.51
Amnesty International did not believe that Rusesabagina will face a fair
trial in what they categorize as an inherently biased judicial system.52
Rusesabagina claims that his arrest violated the rights of his Belgium
citizenship.53 However, Rwandan Prosecutors dismissed his citizenship
argument stating that he still held Rwandan citizenship and how
Belgium officials were made aware of Rwanda’s intent to arrest
Rusesabagina.54 Former Vice-President of the MRCD-FLN, Callixte
Nsabimana, has challenged Rusesabagina innocence of the charges by
claiming his direct involvement with the political organization and
PDR-Ihumure military attacks. With the issue of citizenship,
Nsabimana argued, “how can he claim not to be Rwandan yet when we
launched the rebel group his aim was to be Rwandan president? Would
he be president of a country to which he was not a citizen?”55 Human
Rights Watch argues that Rusesabagina’s arrest was a violation of
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international law.56 Doris Umqicyeza Picard, a Rwandan legal
researcher, argued that while there could be arguments made,
Rusesabagina’s human rights were not violated during his arrest.57
Picard’s opinion piece in the New Times Rwanda, a pro-government
English news media site, has gained traction with Rwandans who often
will cite to it to defend the arrest of Rusesabagina.
Since his arrest, critics of Rwanda’s government have come out to
defend Rusesabagina. Carine Kanimba, the adopted daughter of
Rusesabagina, has become one of the most visible champions against
the arrest. Through social media campaigns and on news media,
Kanimba attests to her stepfather’s innocence and condemns the
Rwandan government and President Kagame for his arrest.58 She has
gained support from critics such as Timothy Longman and Anjan
Sundaram who argue that Rusesabagina’s arrest falls within typical
characteristics of human rights violating behaviors by the Rwandan
government. 59 Phil Clark and Michael Rubin differ by arguing how a
Rwandan court should handle the accusations against Rusesabagina.60
While opinion articles illustrate Global North condemnation of the
arrest, opinions within Rwanda differs.
Shortly after his arrest, Rwandans flooded social media applauding RIB
for capturing Rusesabagina. For years, many Rwandans expressed their
desire for accountability on Rusesabagina’s association with
antagonistic and terrorist organizations. One commented in 2018, “He
lied during the genocide and lies to Westerns at universities when he
says Rwandans like him. We don’t.”61 The New Times Rwanda,
published opinion pieces from the family of victims and survivors of
2018 PDR-Ihumure attacks praising the arrest of Rusesabagina.62 The
response by Rusesabagina’s supporters within the Global North have
helped support narratives of Westerns lecturing to African societies on
how to conduct domestic policy. Fundamentally, the case of
Rusesabagina is more complex than described in many European and
U.S. news media reports. Terry George, the director of Hotel Rwanda,
accurately describes how many Rwandans, including President Kagame
were supportive of the film in its debut.63 However, he misunderstands
the complex nuance reaction to the film in Rwanda. As one high
ranking Rwandan official, who was at the Rwandan premier of the film
in 2005 said,
Hotel Rwanda is a blessing and a curse. Before it came out, so
few people knew of Rwanda or the genocide that happened here.
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There were a few news articles and books about it, but that was
it. People [outside Africa] did not know or even care about the
genocide. But the film brought attention to us. People saw a
dramatic movie of what happened and that brought their
attention. Rusesabagina’s role was exaggerated and even ignored
what really happened at the hotel [Hôtel des Mille Collines]. But
it brought attention to Rwanda.64
The quote provides insight into the perceptions Rwandans hold
towards Rusesabagina both in terms of what he did during the genocide
and after. Many, such as Kayihura whose book criticizes Rusesabagina
and the film, acknowledge his role in bringing global attention to
Rwanda through the film, but that acknowledgment does not dismiss
his criticisms of the government and support of rebel organizations that
call for a military uprising against the current government. 65 The
goodwill towards Rusesabagina had long faded before the attacks in
2018. The current court case, which has pinned responsibility on
Rusesabagina through testimony by Nsabimana and close colleague
Professor Michelle Martin from California State University, only
deteriorates Rusesabagina’s standing in Rwanda despite him bringing
attention to the nation.66 On the September 20, 2021, the court found
Rusesabagina guilty and sentenced him for up to twenty-five years in
jail.67 The international reactions to Rusesabagina’s arrest could impact
how the Rwandan government conducts its foreign policy.

Rwandan Foreign Affairs and the Impact of Rusesabagina’s
Arrest and Trial
Despite condemnation from human rights activists and organizations, a
question arises of how the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina will impact
Rwandan foreign relations. As mentioned, many international actors
have either condemned or expressed concern about the arrest. Clark
commented within the context of the situation how, “Rwanda keeps a
lot of western diplomats up at night just because of how complex the
country is.”68 During past controversies between Rwanda and the
Global North, such as accusations of Rwanda’s interference in neighbor
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its domestic human rights
situation, resulted in foreign aid removal and lessening of diplomatic
ties.69 Rwandan foreign policy has remained relatively resolute in
promoting state interest and security in what best can be understood
within a Neorealist theoretical framework.70 A deeper examination of
Rwanda’s perceptions and beliefs can provide context to understand
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how the Rusesabagina situation will impact Rwandan foreign policy.
Fundamentally, Rwandan officials responsible for crafting and
engaging foreign policy will argue how the themes of abandonment,
agaciro and promoting Rwandan human security takes precedence
over international condemnation over its handling of Rusesabagina.
Description of Rwanda’s foreign engagement with the international
community often falls within the genocide guilt card.71 The concept
holds the narrative that the Rwandan government ‘guilts’ other nations,
especially within the Global North, for their inactions during the
genocide, violating the United Nations Convention on Genocide, in
order to promote state interests.72 Examples of its usage start soon after
the genocide, such as with the 1995 Gersony report which was a United
Nations report examining RPF revenge killings during the genocide.
The Rwandan government used the emotions of guilt and shame for
previous inactions to stop the genocide as a way to justify suppressing
the report by arguing that the international community did not have
the moral authority to criticize how the RPF ended the genocide. 73 It
was used to deflect international criticism of Rwanda’s involvement in
the First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo Wars as well as
later Rwandan military interference in eastern DRC.74 Straus and
Waldorf argue that the policy was still in use over a decade later by
former Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo to deflect
international criticism of Rwanda’s domestic human rights record.75
However, this reductionist description of Rwandan foreign policy
ignores intersubjective beliefs, which with a Constructivist theoretical
lens provides clarity of how these beliefs guide the Rwandan
governments engagements with the international community.
Constructivism examines international relations through the spectrum
of perceiving the international system as composed of a historically and
socially constructed realities based on human nature. Adler provided
perhaps one of the best definitions of Constructivism for this research.
Adler writes that constructivism is, “the view that the manner in which
the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and
interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic
interpretations of the material world.”76 Intersubjectivity, which
contains the different meanings and operations, such as social
practices, discourses, and routines, within the international structure,
describes how states accept and operate to promote their interest and
security. Intersubjectivity beliefs exist regarding the shared ideas of a
group of individuals, typically decision-makers or government
officials.77 Found within these intersubjective beliefs are three
49
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predominate ones composing abandonment, agaciro and promoting
Rwandan human security within the case study of Rwanda.
The intersubjective belief of abandonment comprises from historical
periods of Rwandan abandonment, often during periods of violence, by
the international community. Events include the 1959 Hutu Revolution
that resulted in forced emigration, destruction of property and the
deaths of thousands; various pogroms leading to greater internal
violence throughout the 1960s until the 1990s; the 1994 Genocide
against the Tutsi; post-genocide violence from refugee camps in
neighboring former Zaire; and so on. These events greatly influence the
belief within the current Rwandan government of the necessity to not
rely on international rhetoric which might seem to be supportive of
humanitarian causes or Rwanda’s development but hold little
substance when violence erupts.78 Within the context of Rusesabagina,
Rwandan officials have often felt, especially with the awarding of the
U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2005, that the international
community has abandoned Rwandan criticism of Rusesabagina’s role
during the genocide and his later support for antagonistic forces.
Ibuka, a government umbrella genocide survivors organization,
condemned the promotion of Rusesabagina within the Global North as
an educational ambassador of Rwanda’s genocide despite the near
universal condemnation of his actions by hotel survivors.79 President
Kagame has also criticized the Global North for its reliance on
Rusesabagina, which created a platform for his antagonistic political
rhetoric, while ignoring Rwandan opinions of the genocide and
especially within the Hôtel des Mille Collines.80 While critics might
describe the situation as the Rwandan government attempting to
politically dominate the historical narrative of the genocide, it should
be perceived through the context of the intersubjective belief of
Rwandans perceiving how they are experiencing another form of
abandonment with their voices often ignored in terms of
Rusesabagina.81
Agaciro is the second major intersubjective theme. The concept
typically resides in economic formats such as the Agaciro Development
Fund as described by Behuria.82 Rutazibwa examines agaciro through
domestic, rather than foreign, knowledge production. 83 Akin to
Japanese strategic priority shifts since World War Two as described by
Katzenstein, historical experiences such as the international
abandonment during the genocide fostered a belief of the necessity to
promote self-reliance in terms of state interests, development, and
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security. 84 A common usage of agaciro within Rwandan foreign policy
is the reduction of foreign aid reliance from donor states.85 The arrest
and subsequent trial of Rusesabagina falls within agaciro’s desire for
Rwanda to be self-reliant in matters of security. The Rwandan
government perceives Rusesabagina’s antagonistic rhetoric against
post-genocide development and denial of the genocide as threatening
Rwandan human security, the following intersubjective belief, which
requires the Rwandan government to act. His involvement with the
2018 terrorist attacks, let alone engagement with the FDLR, resulted in
what Rwandans perceive as the necessity for a response. Reliance on
the international community to prosecute Rusesabagina is contrary to
the nation’s agaciro as Rwandans, in this case the state, must rely on
its abilities rather than a foreign entity to arrest and bring
Rusesabagina to justice
Finally, and perhaps more important for this research, is the
intersubjective belief of Rwandan human security. The shifting of
international norms within the Constructivist framework to understand
the international system includes the recent drive towards human
security beyond traditional understandings of state security.86 Several
researchers such as King and Murray, Conteh-Morgan and Newman
provide definitions of human security, as departing Realist’s notions of
state security and survival towards more of a focus on threats and
needs experienced by individuals.87 King and Murray as well as Tsai
provide a more economic and social examination of human security
based from its initial conception by Mahbub ul-Hag from the 1990
United Nations Human Development Report which concentrated on
social rights such as access to healthcare, education and political
freedoms.88 While Conteh-Morgan attempts to provide a more holistic
overview of any structural and cultural, both visible or not, that
threaten the wellbeing of an individual.89 Newman, whose description
follows closely with Rwandan human security, describes how human
security composes, “freedom from want and freedom from fear.”90
Rwandan human security incorporates these Constructivist theoretical
concept to Rwandan history and lived experiences with the output
composing the necessity for the Rwandan government to promote
security, whether physical, economic, social or so on, of all those who
identify as ‘Rwandan’.91 The government’s quest to promote Rwandan
human security introduces the possibility of how ontological security
provides insights into Rwandan security promotion. Mitzen identifies
ontological security to explain why states will prioritise promoting
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security beyond the physical threats towards individual and the state.92
As foreign threats from tangible actors against the government
decreased, intangible threats began to be seen by the Rwandan
government and citizens as greater threats to the nation’s ontological
security. This often focuses on treats posed to that of ‘security as being’
and identity within international politics.93 Steele argues how an
autobiographical narrative impacts the formation of the state’s self.94
The importance of fostering these narratives provides insights into how
the Rwandan government’s promotion of a singular ethnic identity,
also known as Ndi Umunyarwanda, based on its interpretation of
history rather than of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.
Rwandan human security does not incorporate protecting Rwandans
who promote ethnic divisions but instead protects those accused by a
third actor as being a member of Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.95 Rusesabagina’s
involvement and leadership of several antagonist political groups such
as the MRCD, FLN and PDR-Ihumure threaten not only state security
by committing terrorism, but the promotion of ethnic divisionism.
Human security incorporates more traditional notions of security
threats and harm which Rusesabagina is accused of committing
through his support of PDR-Ihumure’s attack in 2018. However,
Rusesabagina’s calls for the overthrowing of the Rwandan government,
re-establishment of ethnic divisions and the more recent denial of
genocidal killings of Tutsis by Hutu extremists threatens Rwandan
human security. Thus, the Rwandan government’s responsibility in
stopping Rusesabagina goes beyond traditional security concerns and
instead as a threat to Rwandan human security.
These intersubjective beliefs found within Rwandan foreign policy
provide an understanding of the reasons for why Rwandan government
officials and its supporters welcomed the arrest and trial of
Rusesabagina. Rather than a human rights issue within the constructs
of human rights norms found within the Global North, Rusesabagina
proposed through his associations and rhetoric a threat to the
Rwandan beliefs, especially of Rwandan human security. Rwandans,
especially those who survived at the Hôtel des Mille Collines during the
genocide, believe Rusesabagina’s global status as a humanitarian based
on acquiring human rights awards and speaking engagements at
universities, is a continuation of abandonment by the international
community. Genocide survivors feel the sense of abandonment,
alongside scholars and journalists such as Melvern and Rubin, who
have campaigned to expose the historical deficits within
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Rusesabagina’s story with little avail.96 It fosters a sense of how
Rwandan’s history of abandonment because of Hotel Rwanda. Finally,
the arrest of Rusesabagina, despite human rights groups calling it a
violation of international law, is perceived within the nation’s agaciro
as the government stopping those who threaten its human security.
While there are always issues of placing a situation within a framework,
can better understand Rwandan policies and foreign policy perceptions
through the case study of Rusesabagina alongside his arrest and trial.

The Global North’s Limited Response
As prior mentioned by Clark, the situation for Global North states is a
bit more complicated. While the European Union has issued a
statement condemning the arrest and trial, there has been relatively
little response by foreign governments. Many Global North nations
have issued statements of how they are following the situation, but as
of writing, there have been no foreign policy shifts. This differs from in
2008 when the Netherlands and Sweden withdrew foreign aid support
after accusations of Rwanda’s domestic democratic mechanisms and
involvement in eastern DRC or in 2012 with accusations of Rwandan
support for the Congolese rebel group, the March 23 Movement
(M23).97 Speculating for the difference of response is challenging but
assumptions based on prior situations provide some possible
explanations for why the international community, at the state level,
has not shifted its foreign engagement with Rwanda.
The first is of the international community’s reliance on Rwanda for
contributing effective soldiers and police in African peacekeeping
missions. Rwanda provides substantial contributions to the Central
African Republic (CAR) [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)],
South Sudan [United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)],
Darfur (Sudan) [United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID)], Haiti [United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
(MINUJUSTH)] and Mali [United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)]. Fisher suggests
that the Rwandan government, similar to Uganda, used its soldier’s
effectiveness and professionalism to reduce contention with donor
nations and promote state interests.98 Beswick adds that Rwanda’s
military capacity building effectiveness since the genocide has made it
possible for it to be an effective contributor to African peacekeeping,
which is used to deflect international criticism.99 There is validity to
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this understanding as seen in 2010, when former Minister of Foreign
Affairs Louise Mushikiwabo threaten to pull Rwandan soldiers out of
UNAMID after a leaked early report from the United Nation’s Group of
Experts accused Rwanda of committing mass human rights violation in
neighboring DRC.100 The fear of losing Rwandan military and police
support for these peacekeeping missions can be a primary reason for
why the international community has largely kept silent during the
arrest and trial of Rusesabagina.
Another reason perhaps why there is a relatively moot response from
foreign states, especially in the Global North, is the necessity of
Rwanda as a case study for proper foreign aid utilization towards
development. As Beswick describes, donor nations rely on Rwanda as a
case example for other aid receiving nations for proper utilization of
foreign aid.101 Rwanda’s anti-corruption policies and efficient usage of
foreign aid for social and economic development affords Rwanda the
leverage with donor nations even more than aid ownership policies.102
Zorbas also illustrates how Rwanda’s effective use of foreign aid has
trumped concerns of its human rights record.103 Thus, donors within
the Global North balance condemning Rwandan policy, in this case
about the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina, with macro-strategic goals
in using Rwanda as a case study to promote good usage of foreign aid
for other aid receiving nations.
Finally, the case of Rwanda’s arrest and trial of Rusesabagina falls
within expected state behaviors. Taking a more Neorealist framework,
Jervis provides some context of why Global North states might not be
particularly concerned about the recent events of Rusesabagina.
Jervis’s examination of perceptions and its consequences on
international structures and foreign policies illustrates how states
desire predictable behaviors from other nations.104 Accusations of
human rights abuses against the Rwandan government is not new with
many Global North government having long established concerns.
During a 2014 interview with a United Kingdom official within the
High Commission in Rwanda, he commented how the Global North
negatively perceives on how Rwanda’s government conducts its
domestic policy in terms of human and political rights, however it has
been effective for the nation’s post-genocide development.105 With the
exception of 2008 with Sweden and the Netherlands and 2012 after the
accusations of Rwanda’s support to the M23, there have only been
minor shifts in the Global North’s engagements with Rwanda.106 This is
despite human rights groups and activists calling for harsher methods.
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Fundamentally, Rwanda’s importance to these nations, whether
because of reliance on Rwandan peacekeepers; as a case study for
foreign aid utilization; or just accustomed to Rwanda’s human rights
record, has not significantly influenced how these nations engage with
Rwanda since the arrest and trial of Rusesabagina.

Conclusion
The disappearance and subsequential arrest of Paul Rusesabagina in
August 2020 reintroduced questions of historical narratives and
human rights concerns in Rwanda. Human rights activists from the
Global North have descended on social and news media to condemn
Rwanda’s capture and trial of Rusesabagina. For most within this
category, the man is best known from the film, Hotel Rwanda. The
2004 film elevated Rusesabagina into an African version of the famous
Holocaust hero Oskar Schindler. Within Rwanda, the complexities of
Rusesabagina’s story have him seen more as an opportunist rather than
a savior. His public condemnation of Rwanda’s post-genocide
development resulted in the founding or collaborating with
antagonistic forces such as the MRCD, FLN and PDR-Ihumure. The
latter would commit two terrorists in 2018, killing nine. These reasons
led to the thirteen accounts with the possibility if convicted to serve
over twenty-years in prison.
Despite the outrage of his arrest and trial by human rights activists, the
international community at the state level has relatively remained
silent. The European Union did issue a statement condemning the
arrest of Rusesabagina but has not enacted public policy changes that
could harm its relations with Rwanda. Rwandan foreign policy will
justify its response to international criticism by explaining the necessity
of his arrest and trial under the intersubjective beliefs of abandonment,
agaciro and promoting Rwandan human security. Nonetheless, many
nation’s governments have issued statements of how they are
concerned and are watching the case as it unfolds. Yet, there have been
no significant foreign policy responses. The likely reasons stem from
reliance on Rwanda for its military contribution to peacekeeping
missions, as a case study for proper aid use for other aid receiving
nations, and an understanding of Rwandan human rights situation that
while it might not fit within the constructs of Global North
understandings of human rights, it nevertheless still exists within
Rwandan society. If the international community is concerned about
the arrest, trial, and prison time of Rusesabagina, they will need to
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understand and work within the constructs of how Rwandan perceives
and engages with the international community.
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